PhD education must not be redefined via a security lens

Doctoral education is increasingly affected by geopolitical tensions and national security concerns. This is a rather new development. For a long time, doctoral education focused on the individual process between supervisors and doctoral candidates, supported by a very personal relationship. Universities merely provided the institutional framework and conferred the degree, but otherwise kept themselves relatively out of the picture.

In recent decades, especially since the adoption of the Salzburg Principles around 20 years ago, this has changed fundamentally. Institutions have taken responsibility and become active players themselves. The development of doctoral schools is impressive evidence of this change. In 2005, less than a quarter of European universities had doctoral schools or structured programmes; today, this is the case for the vast majority.

For a long time, doctoral education remained a protected space, shielded to a certain extent from political influence from above. The increasing focus on rankings and impact in university strategies in recent years has not fundamentally changed this. However, things are now shifting.

Under the banner of ‘knowledge security’ and increased focus on dual-use research, doctoral candidates and their research are increasingly becoming the focus of security policy debates and geopolitical strategies. This could fundamentally change the course and culture of doctoral education.

A new lens

Doctoral schools are currently confronted by issues that did not previously fall within their remit. In certain cases, geopolitical expertise is now just as important as knowledge of different supervision styles. National security interests influence cooperation, topic selection and mobility. Secret services are not only interested in dissertation topics, but also in the people who research them.

To provide some examples: the Danish Security and Intelligence Service published guidelines on espionage protection for researchers in 2023. The Netherlands is introducing a new bill which calls for government screening of researchers and students working in sensitive knowledge areas.

The Flemish funding agency FWO requires a ‘research security appraisal’ in funding applications where researchers self-assess research security risks.

Universities, like ETH Zurich, have established checklists for certain sensitive subject areas and countries. All these activities still focus on the self-responsibility of researchers, but entail a cultural shift and have a concrete impact on research collaborations.

Knowledge security will also play a central role in the next EU research framework programme, FP10, though the details are not clear yet. And recently, the European Commission proposed to end the civilian focus of Horizon Europe and open it to dual-use research. What was once an environment of protected academic development is increasingly being viewed through the lens of risks, misuse of research and geopolitical challenges.

Dual-use research

This development gives doctoral education new visibility and relevance, but also new responsibilities and challenges. Universities have become strategic players that are not only expected to generate knowledge, but also to actively protect the process of knowledge generation.

In this context, dual-use research has increased in relevance. While dual-use research was long seen primarily as a risk in biomedical fields, rapid technological developments have significantly broadened its scope. Areas that were once considered unproblematic are now viewed as security relevant. Massive investments in defence-related applications are accelerating this trend.

Dual-use research calls into question the scientific principle of openness. An article or book intended to disseminate knowledge can become a risk. Scientifically meaningful collaborations can lead to unethical practices and the role of curiosity as a main driver of the research endeavour can be lost.

Protecting doctoral candidates

An excessive focus on security and a shift towards dual-use research can have an unintentional deterrent effect, especially on early-stage researchers: science thrives on pushing boundaries, but when every boundary seems to be mined, it is safer to stay within the bounds of the familiar.

Doctoral candidates may hesitate to pursue original approaches, work in global teams or conduct research in supposedly ‘high-risk’ areas for fear of stepping onto a minefield. If they don’t, they risk not being able to publish their dissertations for ‘security reasons’ – or becoming entangled in complex bureaucratic processes. Yet precisely these ‘sensitive’ topics hold the potential for innovation and competitiveness in European research.

All of this has a chilling effect: important topics are avoided, and even necessary cooperation with other parts of the world is seen as a burden.

The goal is therefore to ensure that knowledge security does not restrict academic freedom but rather enables it. The European Council’s conclusions on knowledge security in 2024 propose a three-part definition: protection against unwanted knowledge transfer, against foreign influence and against research that violates fundamental values.

If this definition is taken seriously, knowledge security also serves the interests of doctoral candidates themselves. They are particularly vulnerable in the early stages of their careers – for example, when certain governments or other actors exert pressure not to research certain topics, or when results are stolen or used unethically. In this sense, security also means protecting early-stage researchers from such interference and preventing the misuse of their research.

To arrive at a values-based understanding of knowledge security, universities, funding bodies and other actors must not allow themselves to be pushed into the role of mere administrators of security interests. They must actively protect doctoral candidates, including from the reduction of knowledge to a strategic asset. Cross-border cooperation must not be placed under general suspicion or excluded altogether.

Transversal skills

Doctoral schools can play a central role in ensuring that knowledge security serves the interests of researchers and societies.

They provide information about risks, but also about the opportunities offered by international cooperation. They can prevent self-censorship and empower researchers to act with ethical judgment and strategic awareness. They can serve as points of contact when concerns arise, providers of guidelines and advocates for the specific situation of doctoral candidates. And they can empower them by providing them with the skills they will need to navigate this terrain.

Training in transversal skills will become increasingly important in this context. This does not mean that additional ‘knowledge security skills’ are required, even when researchers need to be enabled to deal with knowledge-security-related issues that may arise. Rather, specific skills are needed to meet the challenges of the present – intercultural competence, interdisciplinary and critical thinking, research ethics and integrity, communication and reflection skills.

These competencies are indispensable in a complex world and they also make the most sustainable contribution to knowledge security itself. A basic understanding of the history of science, science policy and science diplomacy also needs to be considered as a part of a candidate’s necessary skillset.

Doctoral education must not be redefined through a security lens. Instead, it should be empowered to uphold academic values, enable critical inquiry – and remain open by default.

Alexander Hasgall is an independent expert in research policy and international higher education. Until May 2025, he was head of international funding policy at the Swiss National Science Foundation and previously led the Council for Doctoral Education at the European University Association (2017-23). He currently contributes to various international advisory and governance boards in the field of research and higher education.

This article is a commentary. Commentary articles are the opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of University World News.